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1. Introduction 
Under oligopoly, firms are frequently observed to specialise their production and 
marketing operations so as to occupy definite segments of the market. Some may 
offer highly reliable products or services
1 to the market, perhaps along with valuable 
warranty or compensation arrangements. Other firms may opt for low reliability 
output, perhaps accompanied by less valuable warranties or compensation terms. The 
former will typically charge higher prices than the latter. An obvious, though perhaps 
stylised example, is in the international market for non-luxury cars. Japanese firms 
market expensive, highly reliable cars with good warranty deals while American (or 
perhaps Italian?) firms specialise in less reliable, less expensive cars with less 
valuable warranties (see Barber and Darrough, 1996). Production and quality control 
technologies are more or less common knowledge around the world, so this form of 
specialisation, and the consequent international intra-industry trade in cars, requires 
some explanation other than technological differences. One might appeal to different 
factor endowments, but for mass produced products such as non-luxury cars this 
seems an implausible approach. 
 
Epple and Raviv (1979) and Saving (1982) argue that product reliability may be 
independent of market structure. Goering and Read (1995) develop a two-period 
oligopoly model in which they establish that this independence result is true only 
under very limited conditions, though it generally holds if warranties are legally 
compelled. Their results provide a partial explanation for Avinger’s (1981) empirical 
findings on product obsolescence in the vacuum tube and electric lamp industries. 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper the generic term “output” will be used instead of “product” or “service”.   3 
(See also Caves, Herriges and Windle (1990); Munasinghe and Sanghvi (1988) for 
related discussions.) 
 
A possible theoretical approach to this issue can be found in the product 
differentiation literature. Models with vertically differentiated products have been 
used to explain intra-industry trade under a number of different market structures. For 
example, Falvey (1981) develops such a model while retaining significant aspects of 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework. His approach is to assume that relative 
factor intensity is the main force behind vertical product differentiation. The predicted 
pattern of trade is consistent with the basic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson result, i.e. 
each country exports the quality which uses its relatively abundant factor intensively. 
Shaked and Sutton (1984) analyse vertically differentiated production under 
oligopoly. They develop a three-stage model: firms decide on entry in the first stage, 
quality in the second stage and price in the third stage. Thus the number of firms is 
endogenous. Intra-industry trade can easily emerge in such models but its pattern is 
dependent upon the distribution of income across trading partners. See also 
Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) and Lambertini (1997). Choi and Shin (1992) 
develop a vertical differentiation duopoly model in which all the subgame perfect 
equilibria in pure strategies are asymmetric (one firm setting a high price and high 
quality and the other a low price and low quality). 
 
The model of this paper is in a similar vein to this literature and establishes the 
existence of an asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. However there are some 
crucially different features. Firstly it offers a definition of “reliability” which is 
sharply distinguished from the notion of “quality” in the existing literature. On this   4 
new definition, reliability can be thought of as a relatively flexible variable (similar to 
price or quantity) and there is consequently no need for a multi-stage game 
framework. Secondly it introduces two-dimensions of product differentiation, which 
cannot, therefore, strictly be described as “vertical”. The first dimension is the 
reliability of the firms’ output: the second dimension is the warranty payment which 
firms can choose to offer to the market. These two variables (reliability and 
warranties) cannot, in equilibrium, be chosen arbitrarily by firms, because they are 
linked by consumers’ behaviour towards risk.  
 
Section 2 of the paper develops the analysis of reliability. Sections 3 and 4 apply it to 
a duopoly model (with the mathematical details relegated to an Appendix). Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Modelling Reliability 
 
In the model presented here “reliability” will be defined as “the probability of an 
event disliked by consumers not occurring”. Examples of such an event are: 
A: A consumer durable (e.g. cars, washing machines, televisions etc.) breaking down 
within some given time period. 
B: An intermediate good such as a silicon chip (or other component) failing to 
function correctly (here the “consumer” is another firm). 
C: A train or plane not arriving within some predetermined time period of its 
scheduled arrival time. 
D: Electricity, gas, or water supplies or telephone services being interrupted for more 
than some predetermined period. Note that commercial contracts for these services 
may allow some interruption of service without penalty (e.g. the commercial supply 
of gas). Matsukawa and Fujii (1994) study Japanese electricity consumers and show,   5 
among other things, that they face a trade-off between price and reliability of 
electricity supply. 
 
The probability referred to here is an objective frequency. For example, if a car 
manufacturer produces 100,000 cars each year and 93,000 do not break down within a 
given time period (say one year) the reliability of these cars is 0.93. It will be assumed 
that the firm chooses reliability (as defined here) by varying the stringency of its 
quality control procedures. Thus the firm knows for sure that 7,000 of its cars will 
break down within the year, but it neither knows nor cares which 7,000 they will be. 
Now suppose the firm offers a one-year warranty with its cars, promising 
compensation in the event of a breakdown. In this model the firm faces no 
uncertainty, it knows its revenue and production costs: it knows that there will be 
7,000 claims under the warranty (though not which customers will make them) and it 
knows how much it will have to pay out per claim (that can either be treated as 
endogenous or imposed by a regulator). There is therefore no uncertainty about its 
profits. 
 
Warranties, whether voluntary or legally compelled, have an important bearing on 
decisions affecting reliability because the higher the reliability of a firm's  marketed 
output, the lower the expected warranty costs experienced by the firm (ceteris 
paribus). This connection between warranties and reliability has been apparent to 
managers for some time. Wright (1980), for example, describes events at General 
Motors: 
"I instituted a programme for testing and repairing faulty cars as they came off 
the assembly line - and the results were phenomenal.  It cost about $8 a car, 
which drove The Fourteenth Floor up the wall.  But I figured one way or the 
other we would end up fixing the defects or paying to have them fixed through   6 
recall campaigns or dealer warranty bills........  The internal quality control audit 
revealed a 66% improvement in the quality of a Chevrolet coming off the 
assembly line between 1969 and 1973 models.  And most important, warranty 
costs of our new cars were down substantially." 
 
It will be assumed that consumers (who, in the case of intermediate goods mentioned 
in point B above, will be other firms) have no knowledge about individual products or 
services but do know the reliability of each firm’s output (in the sense defined here). 
Consumers read Which? magazine or Consumer Reports or obtain information on 
reliability from other sources. For example in the UK, the Strategic Rail Authority 
publishes information on the average punctuality of the different rail operators. 
Supplying firms will be assumed to have the same information. This is a plausible 
assumption because it is usually impossible or extremely costly for firms to obtain 
information on each example of its output before it is sold. Firms will be assumed to 
vary reliability (as defined here), by varying the stringency of its quality control 
procedures. It will be assumed that higher reliability entails higher costs (e.g. rework 
or scrapping costs). Thus, the car manufacturer will be able to reduce (or increase) the 
number of breakdowns in a given time period without knowing (or caring) which 
vehicles will break down and which will not. It will therefore be assumed to know the 
reliability of its output (as defined here), without knowing which examples of its 
output will break down. 
 
In this model the firm faces no uncertainty, though this is not true of consumers, who 
are assumed to be risk averse. This assumption is readily justified, for example, in 
consumer durables markets, where each consumer typically owns one example of the 
good and is thus extremely concerned at the prospect of its breaking down. The firm, 
by contrast, supplies many examples of the good, and may well find it profitable to 
operate a risk-pooling warranty scheme. Under these assumptions there arises a   7 
demand, on the part of consumers, for insurance. This might, as mentioned above, be 
provided in the form of a product warranty offered by the firm, or an insurance policy 
provided jointly with the product. In the case of intermediate goods, “warranties” may 
be thought of as compensation clauses built into standard supply contracts. A similar 
interpretation applies to services such as electricity and gas. In the case of transport 
services, it is clearly possible for suppliers to offer compensation to dissatisfied 
passengers. Throughout the paper attention will be confined to voluntarily offered 
warranties or compensation, though the model is readily modified to include legally 
compelled compensation. It could also be modified to cover more than one undesired 
event (e.g. different degrees of product breakdown), or to cover product hazard and 
safety issues.  
 
In the model of this paper, consumers’ preferences have three distinct aspects. 
•  The consumer’s preference for the good in its un-broken-down state. This 
varies across consumers and is exogenous. 
•  The consumer’s degree of risk aversion. For convenience this is assumed 
constant across consumers and is exogenous. 
•  The probability of the good not breaking down within some given time period 
(i.e. the reliability of the good). Subjective and objective probabilities are, by 
definition, identical in this model. It is an essential feature of the model that 
this probability is endogenous (determined by firms’ decisions) and the same 
for all consumers. 
The details of consumers’ utility functions are developed in section 3 of the paper. 
 
 
Note that the model developed in this paper differs sharply from that presented in the 
literature on product quality. “Quality” is usually taken to be a characteristic of goods 
(or possibly services) which is such that more is preferred to less, ceteris paribus, by   8 
all consumers. It is typically assumed that all examples of a good produced by a given 
firm are of the same quality, and that the firm is able to vary this quality (and in so 
doing to vary its costs). This kind of quality variation could come about, for example, 
by redesigning the product or adopting a different technique of production. Quality is 
therefore typically thought of as a relatively inflexible variable (compared with 
quantity or price) and is usually assumed to be set in an early period in a multi-stage 
game model. Reliability, as defined here, is rather different. It is a feature, not of 
individual goods, but of the distribution of goods produced by a particular firm, 
namely the objective probability of the undesired event not occurring. In contrast to 
quality, reliability, as defined here, is a relatively flexible variable. It can be varied by 
changing the stringency of quality control procedures, though an increase in reliability 
brought about in this way would entail higher costs, such as rework or scrapping 
costs.  
 
The literature on experience goods focuses on asymmetric information. “Nature” 
dictates all relevant characteristics of each good or service to the supplier before sale, 
but these are unknown to the consumer at that stage. (E.g. the car’s gear box will fall 
out in the first year, the train will be 2 hours late). The supplier’s problem is thus one 
of signalling. Perhaps by means of advertising, or offering a warranty or 
compensation deal, the supplier of high quality goods/services seeks to signal his high 
quality to consumers in a credible way. See, for example, Grossman (1981), Milgrom 
and Roberts (1982, 1986), Kreps and Wilson (1982), Klein and Leffler (1981), 
Shapiro (1983), and McClure and Spector (1991) for models of this type. Signalling 
models are of use in analysing Akerloff’s (1970) famous lemon seller: he has one car 
to sell, which he has owned for long enough to know all its idiosyncrasies. Potential   9 
buyers are ignorant of these and an enforceable warranty is impossible; thus the 
problem really is one of signalling. Such models do not describe well the new car 
market, where: 
1.  Car firms have thousands of cars for sale but most buyers want a maximum of one 
2.  Consumers read road tests and are well informed about the reliability (in the sense 
defined above) of each firm’s cars 
3.  Car firms provide warranties with all their vehicles 
4.  “Nature” does not dictate reliability to firms; they can vary this by varying the 
stringency of their quality control procedures 
 
Similar arguments could be advanced to justify the application of the model 
developed in this paper to the markets described at points B, C and D above.  
 
A standard problem, often assumed away in the literature, is that of moral hazard on 
the part of consumers. If consumers can themselves influence the probability or size 
of a claim under the warranty, for example by failing to take proper care of the good 
during consumption, then the economic role of warranties may be reduced. See, for 
example McKean (1970), Oi (1973) and Priest (1981). Goering (1997) discusses the 
problem of moral hazard facing a durable goods monopolist.  For simplicity moral 
hazard will be assumed away in this paper.   
 
It should be noted that the model presented here focuses on reliability and warranties, 
deliberately suppressing some other aspects of the markets discussed above. For 
example, it is essentially a static model, and is not intended to deal with the issue of 
dynamic consistency in durable goods markets. Moreover, it is a model of symmetric 
information. In such a model nothing can be gained by admitting the possibility of   10 





3. Consumers and firms 
The demand side of the market will be assumed to consist of z consumers, each 
consuming a single unit of the output. For simplicity we take z to be a strictly positive 
real variable. Each consumer has a money budget M available and pays a price p for 
the good/service. As discussed in section 2, two states of the world are assumed: 
either the undesired event occurs or it does not. In the latter case the z'th consumer 
receives a stream of services which she values at f(z) (perhaps generated by a durable 
good). Note that  z > 0 and f'(z) < 0. In the former case the consumer values the 
stream of services at zero, but the firm makes a voluntary warranty (or compensation) 
payment of β to her. Costs of writing and enforcing the warranty (or compensation) 
contract are ignored. Thus the z'th consumer receives income stream: 
  x = M - p + f(z)                                                                                      (1)          
if the undesired event does not occur, and 
  y = M - p +  β                                                                                        (2) 
if it does.              
 
The reliability of output will be defined as in section 2, as the probability (R) of the 
undesired event not occurring. Consumers are assumed to be risk-averse maximisers 
of expected utility. Throughout the paper it will be assumed (following the discussion 
of section 2) that consumers are well informed about reliability and hence that their   11 
subjective probability of the undesired event not occurring is equal to the objective 
probability (R).  
 
The z'th consumer maximises expected utility: 
  V = R.U(M - p + f(z)) + (1 - R).U(M - p + β)         (3) 
Note that the model is one of partially endogenous preferences, since R is an 
endogenous variable. Clearly U'(.) > 0, and, to ensure risk aversion, it is assumed that 
U''(.) < 0 (i.e. the function U(.) is assumed concave).  
 
Reliability costs are discussed at some length in the management literature (e.g. see 
Bowbrick, 1992). Groocock (1986, p53) points out: 
 
"Because the products might be defective they must be inspected and tested. 
This results in appraisal costs.....Products may also fail a test or inspection, or 
may fail in the hands of customers. Failure costs are then incurred.......(since 
the firm) must rework or replace the failed product during manufacturing, or 
replace or repair the product for customers, for example, under warranty."  
 
The model developed here formalises these costs by assuming that production costs 
are increasing in the reliability (R) of  output, and by incorporating warranty costs into 
the firm's profit-maximising decision. Average and marginal production costs, at a 
given reliability level, will be assumed constant. Note that zj (j = 1,2)  is the output of 
the j’th. firm, Rj (j = 1,2)  is the reliability of the j’th. firm’s output, βj  (j = 1,2) is the 
warranty/compensation payment offered by the j’th. firm and pj  (j = 1,2) is the price 
charged by the j’th. firm.   12 
 
Adopting the assumptions set out above a suitable production cost function is: 
 
  zj.C(Rj),     where C'(Rj) > 0 and C''(Rj) > 0 for 0 < Rj < 1 .                       (5)  
 
Note that both firms are assumed to have identical production and quality control 
technologies, and therefore the same C(.) function. The number of times that the 
undesired event occurs is clearly  zj.(1 – Rj), and thus warranty or compensation costs 
are given by: 
  βjzj(1 – Rj)                  (6) 
Thus each firm maximises profit, given by: 
  Φj = pj.zj – zj.C(Rj) - βjzj(1 – Rj)            (7)  
 
 
4. Structure of the Duopoly Model. 
Following the discussion of section 2, reliability is treated as a relatively flexible 
variable, in contrast to “quality” as defined in the standard literature. It can therefore 
be thought of as being chosen simultaneously with warranties and prices. There is 
therefore no need to appeal to a multi-period game approach. In fact the equilibrium 
concept adopted here is “augmented Bertrand equilibrium”; i.e. Nash equilibrium in 
price, warranty and reliability. For simplicity the entry decision is not modelled. By 
assumption, consumers can purchase one unit from firm 1 or one unit from firm 2, or 
no units: they cannot purchase more than one unit. 
   13 
Let  ) (z Vi (i  = 1,2) be the expected utility obtained by consumer z if she purchases 
from firm i.  I.e.   
 
Vi(z) = Ri.U(M – pi + f(z)) + (1 – Ri).U(M – pi + βι).     (8) 
 
Now conduct the following “thought experiment”: imagine that consumers in the 
interval [ ] 1 , 0 z  are allocated to firm 1 and consumers in the interval ( ] 2 1 1, z z z +  are 
allocated to firm 2 (for some z1 and z2 ). Can an allocation of this form be an 
equilibrium? It will be an equilibrium if it simultaneously satisfies the following two 
conditions: 
A.  The “voluntary participation constraint” for each firm:  ) ( ) ( M U z Vi ≥  (i =1,2), for 
[ ] 2 1 , 0 z z z + ∈ . 
B.  The “single crossing property”:  ) ( ) ( 2 1 z V z V ≥  for  [ ] 1 , 0 z z∈  and  ) ( ) ( 1 2 z V z V ≥ for 
[ ] 2 1 1, z z z z + ∈ . 
Condition A ensures that consumers prefer to consume the output rather than not 
consume it. Condition B guarantees that consumers purchase from the firm whose 
output yields the higher expected utility. Note that the expected utility functions are 
monotonically decreasing in z (i.e.  ) (z Vi′ < 0, for i = 1,2) because  ) (z f ′  < 0 . Hence 
conditions A and B are as depicted in figure 1. 
 
(Figure 1 near here) 
     
The voluntary participation constraint (condition A) will be assumed to be satisfied by 
firm 1. This simply amounts to taking the consumers’ money budget (M) to be low   14 
enough. It remains to prove that firm 2 satisfies the voluntary participation constraint, 
to establish the single crossing property (condition B) and to describe the equilibrium. 
To achieve these objectives we focus on the first order conditions for each firm. Since 
the problem is a concave one, these conditions are necessary and sufficient.  
 
Taking λ as Lagrange multiplier, the appropriate Lagrangian for firm 1 is: 
    [ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 z V z V R z R C z z p L − + − − − = λ β      (9) 
Taking µ as Lagrange multiplier, the appropriate Lagrangian for firm 2 is: 
                 [ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 M U z z V R z R C z z p M − + + − − − = µ β              (10) 
In the Appendix the first order conditions of these Lagrangians are derived. They, in 
turn, provide a basis for describing the equilibrium, establishing the single crossing 
property and showing that the voluntary participation constraint holds for firm 2. 
 
Firstly it is easy to establish that consumer z1 is indifferent between the two firms 
(Appendix, Proposition 1) and that the voluntary participation constraint holds for 
firm 2 (Appendix, Proposition 2). Moreover, the marginal consumers of each firm are 
fully insured (Appendix, Lemmas 1 and 2). Comparing the two firms in duopoly 
equilibrium yields the following results: 
•  Firm 1’s output is more reliable than that of firm 2 (Appendix, Proposition 4). 
•  Firm 1 offers a higher warranty payment than firm 2 (Appendix, Proposition 3). 
•  Firm 1 charges a higher price than firm 2 (Appendix, Proposition 5). 
 
It remains to establish the single crossing property. This is done in the Appendix, 
Proposition 6. 
   15 
 
5. Conclusions   
Under oligopoly firms are often observed to specialise their production, with some 
firms producing highly reliable output and offering good warranty deals, while others 
produce less reliable output and offer less attractive warranties, but charge a lower 
price. The model developed here offers an explanation of this phenomenon. It is 
applicable to the markets for consumer durables, some intermediate goods and some 
services. It develops a new definition of reliability as a relatively flexible variable 
determined endogenously by firms, and entailing partially endogenous consumer 
preferences. The model embodies a plausible cost and information structure and 
introduces two dimensions of product differentiation (reliability and warranties) 
which, in equilibrium, are linked by consumers’ behaviour towards risk.  
 
It is shown that, even when firms have the same cost functions and face the same 
demand conditions, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies in which 
firms specialise in the manner described above. The model provides an explanation of 
the observed pattern of specialisation in the international car market, an explanation 
more plausible than those based on technology differences or factor abundance.  
 
The model does not deal with the entry decision of firms, treating their number as 
given, and it assumes away moral hazard. However it could readily be modified to 
incorporate more than one undesired event, and compulsory as well as voluntary 
warranties, or to cover product hazard and safety issues. 
 




This Appendix contains the results discussed in the main text. The approach is to 
derive and utilise the first-order conditions of the Lagrangians given in the main text. 
 
First define: 
) ( 1 1 1 z f p M x + − ≡  and  1 1 1 β + − ≡ p M y           (A1) 
The Lagrangian for firm 1 (equation 9 in the main text) can now be written: 
[ ] ) ( ) 1 ( )) ( ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
) 1 ( ) (
2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
β λ
β
+ − − − + − − − +
+ − − − =
p M U R z f p M U R y U R x U R
R z R C z z p L
  (A2) 
We now derive the first-order conditions of this Lagrangian: 
[ ] 0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 = ′ − − ′ − + = y U R x U R z Lp λ      (A3) 
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 = ′ − + − − = y U R R z L λ β       (A4) 
[ ] 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = − + + ′ − = y U x U z R C z LR λ β     (A5) 
First we establish: 
Proposition 1. Consumer z1 is indifferent between firms 1 and 2. I.e. the constraint in 
the Lagrangian of equation 9 (or A2) holds with equality. 
Proof. Since z1 > 0 by assumption, it follows from (A3) that λ > 0. Hence, by 
complementary slackness, the relevant constraint must hold with equality. 
 
It is now straightforward to establish the useful: 
Lemma 1.  The marginal consumer of firm 1’s output is fully insured. I.e. y1 = x1, or 
equivalently, β1 = f(z1).   17 
Proof.  Equations A3 and A4 yield   [ ] 0 ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 = ′ − ′ x U y U R λ . Since R1 > 0, by 
assumption, and  λ > 0 (by Proof of Proposition 1) it follows that 
[ ] 0 ) ( ) ( 1 1 = ′ − ′ x U y U . But, by the assumption of risk averse consumers,  (.) U ′ ′ < 0. 
Hence the function  (.) U′ is invertible. It follows that. y1 = x1, or equivalently, β1 = 
f(z1), as required. 
Corollary 1.   ) ( 1 1 R C′ = β . 
Proof. Follows from equation (A5) 
 
Now define: ) ( 2 1 2 2 z z f p M x + + − ≡  and  2 2 2 β + − ≡ p M y     (A6) 
The Lagrangian for firm 2 (equation  10 in the main text) can now be written: 
[ ] ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 M U y U R x U R R z R C z z p M − − + + − − − = µ β  (A7) 
We now obtain the first order conditions of this Lagrangian: 
    [ ] 0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 2 2 2 2 2 2 = ′ − − ′ − + = y U R x U R z M p µ     (A8) 
    0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 2 2 2 2 = ′ − + − − = y U R R z M µ β       (A9) 
    [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 y U x U z R C z M R − + + ′ − = µ β     (A10) 
It is now straightforward to establish: 
Proposition 2. The voluntary participation constraint holds for firm 2. I.e. the 
constraint in the Lagrangian of equation 10 (or A7) holds with equality. 
Proof.  Equation (A8) yields µ > 0,  since z2 > 0 by assumption. Hence, by 
complementary slackness, the corresponding constraint must hold with equality, as 
required. 
It is now straightforward to establish the useful: 
Lemma 2. The marginal consumer of firm 2’s output is fully insured. I.e. y2 = x2, or 
equivalently, β2 = f(z1 + z2).   18 
Proof.  Equation  (A9) yields:  ) ( 2 2 y U z ′ = µ . Substituting in (A8) gives:  
[ ] 0 ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 = ′ − ′ x U y U R µ . But R2 > 0, by assumption, and µ > 0, from the proof of 
Proposition 2. Hence: [ ] 0 ) ( ) ( 2 2 = ′ − ′ x U y U . By the argument of Lemma 1 the 
function  (.) U′ is invertible. It follows that. y2 = x2, or equivalently, β2 = f(z1 + z2), as 
required. 
Corollary 1.  ) ( 2 2 R C′ = β  
Proof. Follows from equation (A10) 
 
It is now straightforward to compare the two firms in duopoly equilibrium. First we 
establish: 
Proposition 3. Firm 1 offers a higher warranty payment than firm 2. I.e. β1 > β2. 
Proof. We have β1 = f(z1) from Lemma 1 and β2 = f(z1 + z2) from Lemma 2. Since    
(.) f ′ < 0 by definition, the result follows. 
Next we demonstrate: 
Proposition 4.  Firm 1’s output is more reliable than that of firm 2.  
I.e. R1 > R2. 
Proof.  From Lemma 1, Corollary 1 we have: ) ( 1 1 R C′ = β and from Lemma 2, 
Corollary1 we have  ) ( 2 2 R C′ = β . But  (.) C ′ ′ > 0 by assumption. Hence the result 
follows from Proposition 3. 
 
Finally we establish: 
Proposition 5.  Firm 1 sets a higher price than firm 2. I.e. p1  > p2. 
Proof. From Proposition 3 we have  
        ) ( ) ( 1 2 1 1 z V z V =         (A11)   19 
From Lemma 1 we can substitute β1 = f(z1) into (A11). This yields: 
)) ( ( ) 1 ( )) ( ( )) ( ( 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 z z f p M U R z f p M U R z f p M U + + − − + + − = + −   
But  ) ( 2 1 z z f +  <   ) ( 1 z f . Noting that  (.) U′ > 0 and that 0 < R2 < 1, it follows that: 
    )) ( ( 1 1 z f p M U + − <  )) ( ( 1 2 z f p M U + −  
Again noting that (.) U′ > 0, it follows that p1  > p2, as required. 
 
We now establish the single crossing property (property B in section 5 of the main 
text). 
Proposition 6. The single crossing property holds. 
Proof.  First define: 
        ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 z V z V z W − ≡        (A12) 
Expanding the function W(.) gives: 
  W(z) = [R1.U(M – p1 + f(z)) + (1 – R1).U(M – p1 + β1)] –  
  [R2.U(M – p2 + f(z)) + (1 – R2).U(M – p2 + β2)]         (A13) 
Now f(z) is monotonically strictly decreasing and R1  >  R2  (Proposition 4). Hence, 
provided f(z) is steep enough, it must be the case that W(z) > 0, for low enough z and  
W(z) < 0, for high enough z. It now remains to establish that W(z) is strictly 
monotonically decreasing, since that would imply the existence of a unique z1 such 
that W(z1) = 0, the required result. Differentiating (A13) yields: 
  [ ] )) ( ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 z f p M U R z f p M U R z f z W + − ′ − + − ′ ′ = ′       (A14) 
But  ) (z f ′  < 0 and  (.) U′ > 0 by assumption. Moreover, p1  > p2 by Proposition 5 and        
R1  >  R2   by Proposition 4. Hence the term in square brackets in (A14) must be 
strictly positive. Hence    ) (z W′ < 0, and the result follows. 
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